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Abstract
Economics has developed into a quantitative discipline that makes extensive use of mathematical and statistical 
concepts. When writing a dictionary for economics undergraduates it has to be recognised that many users will not 
have suffi cient training in mathematics to benefi t from formal defi nitions of mathematical and statistical concepts. In 
fact, it is more than likely that the user will want the dictionary to provide an accessible version of a defi nition that 
avoids mathematical notation. Providing a verbal description of a mathematical concept has the risk that the outcome 
is both verbose (compared to a defi nition using appropriate mathematical symbols) and imprecise. For the author of a 
dictionary this raises the question of how to resolve this confl ict between accessibility and formal correctness. We use a 
range of examples from the Oxford Dictionary of Economics to illustrate this confl ict and to assess the extent to which 
a non-formal defi nition can be viewed as authoritative.
1. Introduction
The paper is based on our experiences of preparing the revised edition of the Oxford Dictionary of 
Economics and especially with delivering appropriate formality and rigor while ensuring that the 
dictionary provided defi nitions that were accessible by its intended audience. It was determined 
at the start of the revision process that the primary audience would be fi rst-year undergraduate 
students in economics. We also aimed to address much of the material to students of economics 
at a lower level and specifi cally included technical defi nitions for more advanced students. Al-
though they were not our primary audience we also expected that much of the content would be 
benefi cial to non-specialist readers. In addressing the dictionary to this audience the major chal-
lenge was to select the level of technical formality. If this was too low then the dictionary would 
merely describe but not explain. If it was too high then the dictionary would not be accessible for 
its target audience. In the discussion that follows we explain why the level of technical formality 
is so important in an economics dictionary and describe our approach to resolving this diffi culty.
The 4th edition of the Oxford University Press Dictionary of Economics (referred to from here 
forward as the Dictionary) was published in 2012. This edition was a revision by Hashimzade 
and Myles of the 3rd edition that included many concepts that had come to prominence during the 
fi nancial crisis of 2009. The 3rd edition, published in 2009, was a major revision by Hashimzade 
and Myles of the 2nd edition written solely by John Black and published in 2002. In our discus-
sion we will focus upon the production of the 3rd edition because that is the point at which the new 
style was imposed upon the dictionary. The intention of the publishers when commissioning the 
3rd edition was that there would be some minor updating of the content given economic and, per-
haps, political developments, as well as the addition of a small number of new entries refl ecting 
the development of economics as a discipline. This was also our original intention until the point 
at which we carefully read and evaluated the content of the 2nd edition.
There were several other dictionaries available at the time of preparing the 3rd edition. These 
were very carefully analysed for style and a thorough comparison made of content. A spreadsheet 
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was compiled of the signifi cant entries in these alternatives that were not in the 2nd edition. The 
analysis of the alternative dictionaries revealed a range of problems. First, there was a general 
tendency for these dictionaries to be out-of-date with respect to recent advances in the discipline. 
Second, the 2nd edition and all the alternatives were incomplete and in each various important 
topics were absent. Finally, the level of mathematical formality was too low in all of these dic-
tionaries. We discuss this important issue in considerable detail below. A side issue: with increas-
ing use of the internet online defi nitions had become readily available and we needed to add value 
over these. 
The revisions for the 3rd edition focussed upon changing the style of many existing entries, re-
moving value judgements, expressions of opinion, and political bias. We also eliminated the con-
siderable repetition in entries (see later examples). The 2nd edition included entries on basic math-
ematics, such as linear equation, that were removed. This decision was based on the view that it 
was an economics dictionary and not a mathematics dictionary. We also had to amend substan-
tially many economic entries that had mathematical content. Numerous defi nitions were added on 
econometric concepts, this being one area that had transformed since the 2nd edition.
The fi rst set of changes primarily refl ected the individual academic styles of the new co-au-
thors and their assessment of the extent to which any personal and/or societal value judgements, 
and political views, should be included within academic writing. The changes refl ect the view that 
no such expressions should be included. The revised defi nitions consequently focus on concepts 
and facts, and implications derivable by logical argument. It is the second group of changes con-
cerning mathematics and econometrics that are the focus of this paper. These changes refl ect the 
transformation of economics as a discipline and the transformation of education in economics. It 
is here that the issue of achieving the appropriate level of formality while retaining accessibility 
had to be confronted.
The fi nal questions that we address in the paper are whether a paper dictionary is justifi ed and 
what an online version of our dictionary could deliver. There are many existing online dictionar-
ies, and so it might be argued that the marketplace is crowded and a new entrant is unnecessary. 
However, a review of online dictionaries will show that defi nitions are often too brief and super-
fi cial, and that economic concepts are often dominated in context by fi nancial applications. There 
is also the issue of reliability that arises with the anonymous nature of online defi nitions. 
Section 2 reviews the increase in formality in economics from a historical perspective via some 
landmark contributions. Section 3 discusses the role of formal reasoning in economics. Section 4 
describes how we tried to meet the confl icting requirements of accessibility and formality using 
examples from the Dictionary. Section 5 explores authority and accessibility, and again uses ex-
ample from the Dictionary. Section 6 considers what an online dictionary could contribute. Con-
clusions are given in section 7.
2. Formality in economics
Over the past century economics has evolved rapidly as an academic discipline. It has developed 
from literary roots in political economy to a highly analytical science that uses advanced mathe-
matics and statistics. Education in economics refl ects this transformation. Even in the very recent 
past the emphasis of education was upon debate and discussion and focussed around the “essay”. 
It has now become increasingly concerned with the teaching of analytical techniques and assess-
ment in the application of those techniques.
These changes have been matched by an evolution in the form of communication in econom-
ics. The political economy of the 19th century emerged as a contribution to political debate and 
was expressed in standard vocabulary with limited use of technical terms. This situation began 
to change at the start of the 20th century when economics began to develop as a scientifi c disci-
pline in its own right. It has now become a mathematical and formal discipline that places great 
importance on analytical and logical rigor. We now describe some of the landmarks in this evo-
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lution to provide a context for the issues that need to be confronted when writing a dictionary of 
economics.
Two notable landmarks were the Economic Journal papers by Frank P. Ramsey, a British econ-
omist, on economic growth and optimal taxation. The central component of both papers was a 
substantive mathematical analysis as opposed to a discussion of institutions or data. Ramsey 
(1927) analysed the optimal set of commodity taxes by solving the maximisation of social wel-
fare subject to the government budget constraint, elegantly expressing the necessary conditions in 
terms of elasticities (ratios of proportional changes in prices and quantities). The Ramsey (1928) 
growth paper used the principles of control theory to characterise the optimal consumption path 
over an infi nite lifecycle. At the time of publication the papers stood in marked contrast to the 
other research published in the same issues of the journal. For example, “A Mathematical Theory 
of Saving” by Ramsey in vol. 38 of the Economic Journal was preceded by “Increasing Returns 
and Economic Progress” by A.A. Young and followed by “The Incidence of Taxation in Agricul-
ture” by J.A. Venn; neither of these presented a formal mathematical treatment of the issue in the 
title. Typically for the contemporary economic literature, both these papers are purely descrip-
tive, although a “Note” to Young’s paper contains a schematic diagram to illustrate the main point.
The 1939 treatise Value and Capital by John Hicks, another outstanding British economist, in-
troduced matrix methods into the mainstream. The signifi cance of Value and Capital was that it 
was intended to be widely read by economists in general, and not just by a narrow audience of 
specialists. The matrix methods of Hicks eventually became a staple component of economics un-
til being displaced by more general and more rigorous alternatives.
The Theory of Games (1947) by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern demonstrated be-
yond doubt the value of formal reasoning. It is no exaggeration to say that the treatise created an 
entirely new academic discipline of game theory and, simultaneously, established some of the 
most profound results in that discipline. The formalisation of game theory completely changed 
the direction of economic reasoning and showed that the subject was a suitable fi eld for applied 
mathematics.
The benefi t of further abstraction was shown by Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual 
Values (1951). The book took as its starting point a disparate collection of observations about vot-
ing processes but fi nished with one elegant conclusion, now known as Arrow’s Impossibility The-
orem, which proved the general principle underlying the individual results. The argument used by 
Arrow was not to add further cases to the existing set but to start from an entirely new perspective. 
A set of axioms were proposed and the logical consequences of those axioms derived. The emer-
gence of the Impossibility Theorem was a resounding success for formality.
Finally, Theory of Value (1959) by Gerard Debreu completed a programme of research begun 
in the 19th century. Economists model markets by thinking of demand and supply being deter-
mined by prices. An equilibrium occurs when demand is equal to supply (see the discussion below 
for more analysis of this point). The natural question to ask is whether there exists a set of prices 
that ensure the markets for all goods can be in equilibrium simultaneously. Many great econo-
mists, including Adam Smith, Leon Walras and Abraham Wald, had contributed to the discussion 
of the existence of equilibrium in a competitive market but none had resolved the question. The 
fi rst proofs of existence appeared in 1954 (Arrow/Debreu, McKenzie) and drew on mathematical 
analysis and the theory of convexity to provide formal conditions under which a competitive equi-
librium would exist. Theory of Value provided the defi ning statement of this literature using the 
most general conditions known at the time. The imposing volume Microeconomic Theory (1995) 
by Mas-Collel, Whinston and Greene, now a mandatory textbook for doctoral students in eco-
nomics worldwide, is effectively a fi nal compendium of this literature. 
These advances in the mathematical formalisation of economic models were paralleled by the 
development of the methods for quantitative analysis of economic data. Early attempts to estab-
lish quantitative relationships between economic and political variables can be traced to the 16th 
century in work by “political arithmeticians”. In the late 19th century economists started apply-
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ing the new achievements of probability theory and statistics to the analysis of patterns in various 
economic, social, and demographic indicators. 
In the fi rst decades of the 20th century much of the interest was in quantifying the patterns of 
“economic cycles”, without, however, detailed analysis of the forces driving the cycles. However, 
it was not until the 1930–40s that statistical methods came into systematic use in the quantitative 
analysis of economic relationships implied by economic models, and econometrics became an ac-
knowledged discipline. The focus was on adapting the existing statistical methods and developing 
new methods given the specifi c features of economic data (such as, for example, the fundamental 
inability of a researcher to control external factors, as one would do in an experiment in physics 
or chemistry, or to observe and measure important factors governing economic decisions, such as 
individual tastes or degree of impatience). 
In the 1960s the main focus was on macroeconomic forecasting, mostly based on ad hoc “in-
tuitive” assumptions on the links between aggregate economic indicators; with the development 
of formal economic models new econometric techniques emerged that could be used to test more 
sophisticated models. This progress was greatly helped by the increase in the available computing 
power. Modern econometrics is, effectively, a branch of applied mathematics, and even the very 
basic knowledge of econometrics requires formal mathematical training.
Thus, mathematical background and analytical rigor are nowadays, perhaps, the most valuable 
assets of a successful economist. Rankings of journals refl ects this. In the infl uential Diamond 
List and Keele Ranking most of the highest-ranked journals are the most analytical. For our nar-
rative it is important to note that the research literature was far ahead of economics education. 
This was a consequence of the fact that many of the contributors were trained as mathematicians 
or physicists. So they naturally used the analytical methods of those disciplines. The teaching of 
formal methods did not really enter into the economics curriculum until the 1970s, and then to 
greatly varying degrees in different institutions. 
By the end of the 20th century economics was in a position of a discipline in which research 
was far advanced over education. During the transition many students who received an educa-
tion in economics did not receive an adequate training in mathematical and statistical techniques. 
There is a gap that has to be spanned by the author of a dictionary, who, therefore, must have a 
comprehension of the formal methods and an ability to convey meaning to an audience that has 
not.
3. The role of formal reasoning
The brief history in section 2 traced the development of formal methods in economics. Many peo-
ple are surprised when they fi rst discover the economics is primarily a mathematical and statisti-
cal discipline. Perhaps this is because most exposure for the non-specialist is via the media where 
basic economic statistics are discussed and elementary ideas are enrolled into political debate. If 
a non-formal version of economics is suitable for these purposes, why has academic analysis de-
veloped economics into a formal discipline?
The fi rst reason is the standard applied to all disciplines: specialists need a language in which 
they can communicate effectively without the looseness and vagaries of everyday communica-
tion. This argument only goes part of the way since it justifi es a formal language but not neces-
sarily mathematics as the basis of that language. The standard additional argument is that the use 
of mathematics ensures that arguments are logically correct and coherent. From this perspective, 
the need to formalise an argument prevents any doubt about what has been assumed and what is 
subsequently established. It also provides a basis from which assumptions can be tested, and per-
mits their effect upon the outcome of the argument to be tested. These arguments could be ap-
plied equally to any of the social sciences yet economics has followed a different path to the oth-
ers. The reason for this must lie in the fact that economics is fundamentally quantitative in the 
objects that it discusses. Economic indicators, such as output, consumption, infl ation, exchange 
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rates, prices, and unemployment, are all measurable quantities, and so immediately invite the ap-
plication of mathematics.
From an educational perspective the formal aspect of economics is of considerable value to 
students. The completion of an economics degree is a signal of analytical competency and nu-
meracy. These are valued capabilities in the labour market and are refl ected in the salaries paid to 
graduate economists. The formality also makes life easier for academic staff since the teaching 
and examining of mathematical exercises is less time consuming than the grading of essays. This 
is a particular benefi t when the student to staff ratio is high (due to increasing demand for econom-
ics degrees), or when teaching is in a non-native language either for students or for the instructor 
(due to growing internationalisation of economics departments). 
There are objectors to this status quo who argue that the formal approach to economics has not 
delivered. There has been a recent proposal in the UK to move to a less formal curriculum, but 
this is unlikely ever to be taken seriously since it refl ects the views of a minority who have not 
succeeded in formal economics and therefore are not perceived by the majority to have credibility 
in this argument. Another objection is that there are very few substantive results in some key ar-
eas of economics. For example, the major conclusion of consumer theory is that the Slutsky sub-
stitution matrix is negative semi-defi nite. This is a weak mathematical restriction but has neither 
been validated or rejected by empirical research. This fi nal point can be developed further into the 
observation that none of the formal results has been verifi ed by either data or experiment. The ar-
gument has also been advanced that simpler reasoning is more successful than sophisticated rea-
soning. An example of this is the view of some macroeconomists that the simple IS-LM model 
provides as good an explanation of the macro economy as any of the more sophisticated models. 
The perceived failure of complex models to predict the recent fi nancial crisis is another argument 
against their use.
We cannot agree with these arguments. The proponents of the IS-LM model also failed to pre-
dict the fi nancial crisis, and it could be argued that the fi nancial crisis was partly caused by a defi -
cit of formal training of participants in fi nancial markets. If the purchasers of collateralised securi-
ties had had the proper training to evaluate what they were purchasing then the inherent riskiness 
of the instruments could have been correctly assessed. In addition, some of the results of for-
mal economics have completely transformed the world. The most notable example is the Black-
Scholes analysis of options pricing which has underpinned the fl ourishing of fi nancial markets in 
the past 30 years. On a slightly smaller scale, the application of auction theory raised billions of 
pounds for the UK government in the 3G auction. Game theory has also featured prominently in 
the planning of warfare.
In addition, even if formality does not deliver in the present then it is a step to a proper eco-
nomics for the future. The subject is still in its infancy and will need the techniques for the future. 
There is also an issue of applicability of existing techniques from natural sciences in the econom-
ics context. Even a small step from a simplifi ed to a more “realistic” model often greatly increas-
es complexity (all electrons are the same whereas all people are different). Techniques for the 
analysis of complex systems are relatively new in mathematics. Also, development of computing 
power makes at least some numerical analysis of complex systems possible; hence, programming 
becomes another useful formal skill. 
Whichever of these arguments is correct it is unlikely that formal reasoning in economics will 
become redundant in the near future. If anything, a greater emphasis will be placed on formal-
ity in the short term due to the rewards (appointments, publications, market value) for more for-
mal work. In the words of game theory, academic economists are engaged in a form of “rat race” 
in which the user of the greater degree of formality receives a greater prize, prompting others to 
strive for an even greater degree of formality in a constant competition for prizes. The discipline 
rewards technical expertise, and so encourages ever greater technical sophistication.
The implication of the use of formality in economics is that it requires specialist knowledge to 
provide the translation of the formal language of the discipline into a form of language that can 
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be understood by the target audience of a dictionary. It cannot be done by collecting together the 
defi nitions that are publicly available online since these are not always correct (and an example is 
given below). Instead, it can only be done by specialist compilers who understand the formality 
and appreciate the requirements of the target audience. We also wish to argue that it is probably 
a task that requires more than one specialist compiler given the current breadth of the discipline. 
These compilers also need to have complementary expertise.
4. Defi ning concepts
The construction of a defi nition of a concept for a dictionary of economics faces the compiler with 
two major challenges. First, the compiler of a dictionary may not have had the training necessary 
to understand many formal concepts. Second, a dictionary needs to explain ideas that are beyond 
the training of many readers. The fi rst point can result in errors, misunderstandings, and omis-
sions, of which of a typical reader will be unaware. With the readers relying on the authority of 
the compiler of the dictionary, there is a danger that an erroneous defi nition becomes an accepted 
wisdom. The second point provides the challenge for the compiler.
The 1st and 2nd editions of the Dictionary were written by an Oxford-educated author John 
Black, a well-known British economist and author of many books and journal articles. Paradoxi-
cally, in economics Oxford took the best students but provided the worst training. It did not rec-
ognise the advance in technique, and so the economics programme included no mathematics or 
statistics until the late 1980s. The Oxford tradition in economics put more emphasis on the ability 
to understand and express economic concepts and relationships at an intuitive level, rather than 
in the form of mathematical relationships. Such training did not provide the best preparation for a 
rapidly advancing and increasingly mathematical discipline.
The early editions of the Dictionary were a product of this tradition. The number of entries that 
intended to give accessible defi nitions of advanced concepts was very low. Many important re-
sults to be found in the technical literature were absent, even when they involved the most fun-
damental concepts. Revising the defi nitions in the Dictionary according to the modern approach 
highlighted the challenge of achieving accessibility while maintaining adequate formality.
We now use several examples to illustrate these points. We demonstrate the weaknesses of the 
defi nitions used in the 2nd edition and describe how we attempted to make improvements.
4.1. Example 1
The fi rst example is consumer behaviour. The defi nition from the 2nd edition is:
 consumer behaviour The way in which consumers choose how to spend their incomes. One theory 
of consumer behaviour views consumers as having *utility functions showing the levels of satisfac-
tion they will derive from every possible set of goods and services. They choose their expenditures to 
maximize their utility subject to the constraints imposed by their incomes and the prices facing them. 
This view assumes that tastes are given, independent, and fully known, and that information is free, 
complete, and reliable. Critics of this position point out that the set of available goods and services 
is continually changing, that knowledge about what is available is partial, expensive, and unreliable, 
and that consumers’ own tastes evolve as they age and their marital status changes. It should also be 
pointed out that a large proportion of consumers are members of multi-person households, and are at-
tempting in their spending to please more than one person. Consumers thus work partly on a basis of 
*satisfi cing, that is, repeating satisfactory purchases until something goes wrong, and partly on a basis 
of trial and error, to explore their own reactions to products they have not previously tried. This posi-
tion leaves more scope for *advertising to infl uence purchases than the view that consumers maximize 
a fi xed utility function subject to known constraints.
The fi rst italicised comment is formally incorrect. The theory does not view consumers as having 
utility functions. Instead, it provides conditions under which a consumer will behave as if their 
choices are guided by the maximisation of a utility function. The second italicised statement that 
“information is free, complete, and reliable” dismisses the entire theory of consumer choice un-
17
der uncertainty, or with costly information acquisition. The invocation of “critics” fails to identify 
who these critics may be, or to provide direction as to where these arguments can be found. The 
statement about multi-person households raises an important point but does not develop it ade-
quately. Once this point is raised the reader needs to be directed to an entry on household decision 
making to explore the implication. The fi nal two italicised phrases are an example of an entirely 
speculative statement that has no evidential basis.
The revised version given in the 3rd edition abbreviates the defi nition to maintain the core in-
formation. It provides the correct statement on the utility function and briefl y explores the impli-
cations of satisfi cing:
 consumer behaviour The way in which consumers choose how to spend their incomes. In economic 
theory it is usually assumed that every consumer is aware of their wants and how to satisfy them and 
that consumers attempt to maximize the benefi ts received from consumption of goods and services. 
Thus, consumers behave as to maximize their preferences or *utility function. An alternative view is 
that consumers work partly on a basis of *satisfi cing, that is, repeating satisfactory purchases until 
something goes wrong, and partly on a basis of trial and error, to explore their own reactions to prod-
ucts they have not previously tried. This position leaves more scope for *advertising to infl uence pur-
chases than the view that consumers maximize a fi xed utility function subject to known constraints.
4.2. Example 2
The next example uses two related statistical terms. The point of this example is to show how the 
lack of organisation of the defi nitions and the repetition that was involved can undermine their 
value for the reader. The entry for the fi rst term, heteroskedasticity (the 2nd edition uses an alter-
native spelling, with c in place of k), provides a defi nition in the fi rst two sentences, then mentions 
the second term, homoskedasticity, and after that returns to heteroskedasticity. The entry for ho-
moskedasticity is even less consistent: the fi rst two sentences defi ne homoskedasticity, the third 
sentence refers to heteroskedasticity, the fourth returns to homoskedasticity, and the fi fth switches 
again to heteroskedasticity. The fi nal sentence is the same in both entries, even though it is less 
relevant for homoskedasticity. We use italics to highlight these sentences.
The defi nitions from the 2nd edition:
 heteroscedasticity Having different variances. Data are heteroscedastic if their variations are not con-
sistent with being random drawings from the same population. This is contrasted with *homoscedas-
ticity, where the data appear consistent with being random drawings from the same distribution. Many 
statistical procedures are not strictly valid for heteroscedastic data. Data on time-series drawn from a 
world with changing structures, or cross-sections of different industries or countries, can easily turn 
out to be heteroscedastic. 
 homoscedasticity Having the same variance. Data are homoscedastic if their variations are consistent 
with being random drawings from the same population. This is contrasted with *heteroscedasticity, 
that is, having different variances. Many statistical procedures are only strictly valid for homoscedas-
tic data. Data on time-series drawn from a world with changing structures, or cross-sections of differ-
ent industries -or countries, can easily turn out to be heteroscedastic. 
The revisions removed the repetition and ordered material in a more consistent way. We also tried 
to explain the relevance of concepts and to link the headword to related concepts. These are the 
revised defi nitions:
 heteroskedasticity Having different variances. A set, or a vector of observations is heteroskedastic if 
the variance is different for different observations. Heteroskedasticity observed in the cross-sectional 
data typically is related to the scale effect: often, larger cross-sectional units are subject to larger errat-
ic values of the disturbance. In time series data it may take the form of serial correlation in the variance 
(*autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, or ARCH). It may also be introduced by model mis-
specifi cation. In the presence of heteroskedasticity OLS estimators of the coeffi cients are consistent 
but ineffi cient; those of the standard errors are inconsistent, and hence the standard inference based on 
the estimated standard errors is invalid. Among the popular tests for heteroskedasticity are *Breusch-
Pagan, *Glejser, and *White’s tests. Two approaches to estimation with heteroskedastic data are the 
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*generalized least squares (both the coeffi cients and the standard errors are re-estimated) and the het-
eroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (only the estimated standard errors are corrected). 
 homoskedasticity Having the same variance. A set, or a vector, of observations is homoskedastic if 
the variance is the same for all observations. This is one of the classical linear regression assumptions 
underlying the *Gauss-Markov theorem. Violation of this assumption is called *heteroskedasticity.
4.3. Example 3
Here is the defi nition of an equilibrium (perhaps, the central concept in economics) in the 2nd edi-
tion. We have highlighted the key words using italics:
 equilibrium A situation in which nobody has any immediate reason to change their actions, so that 
the status quo can continue, at least temporarily. This concept is applied in economics in a number of 
related ways. These concern microeconomics, macroeconomics, and game theory.
What is wrong with this? “Nobody” suggests people – but a defi nition should encompas fi rms and 
governments. The use of “immediate reason” suggests the existence of time, but we want the defi -
nition to apply to both temporal and atemporal settings. The same comment applies to “continue”. 
Finally, the use of “related” is simply too vague.
This is the entry for equilibrium in the 3rd edition:
 equilibrium An equilibrium can be defi ned either as a position of balance in the economy or, equiva-
lently, as a situation in which no agent in the economy has any incentive to modify their chosen strat-
egy. The fi rst defi nition is derived from the perspective of equilibrium occurring when the forces of 
supply are balanced by the forces of demand. The second defi nition derives from the theory of games 
and is illustrated by the equilibrium of an oligopolistic market in which all fi rms are satisfi ed with their 
choice of output level given the choices of their rivals.
4.4. Example 4
Further diffi culties are illustrated by the defi nition of duality which has proved an important con-
cept in the analysis of the consumer and the fi rm. It has also found numerous application in ap-
plied fi elds of economics. 
From the 2nd edition of the Dictionary, with key phrases highlighted with italics:
 duality The fact that economic problems stated in terms of one set of variables can also be considered 
in terms of an alternative set. For example, in *linear programming, the problem may be to maximize 
the value of output subject to resource constraints. The dual problem corresponding to this involves 
choosing shadow prices to minimize the value put on resources, consistent with fi rms breaking even 
producing outputs subject to constraints imposed by the available techniques of production. It can be 
shown that these approaches lead to the same results. Which problem is simpler to handle computa-
tionally varies from case to case.
This defi nition is wrong in two signifi cant ways. First, it is not one set of variables and an alterna-
tive set – it is the same sect of choice variable for both versions of the problem. Second, the dual 
problem described is simply wrong. It is, in fact, the choice of inputs to minimise resource cost 
subject to achieving the required output. Finally, the last sentence is a throwaway remark that has 
no basis in evidence.
The revised defi nition in the 3rd edition of the Dictionary states that:
 duality The idea that there are multiple ways of viewing a single issue. More formally, duality applied 
to optimization theory states that every maximization problem has a dual minimization problem and 
vice versa. Any problem can be transformed into its dual by interchanging constraints and objectives. 
In consumer theory the problem of maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint is dual to mini-
mizing expenditure subject to achieving a given level of utility. The use of duality provides alternative 
ways to represent the solution. For example, the *expenditure function and the *indirect utility func-
tion are equivalent representations of consumer behaviour.
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In this section we have illustrated our approach to the revision of the defi nitions and some of the 
issues that had to be addressed. We now move on to the important issue of combining correctness 
with accessibility.
5. Authority and accessibility
In preparing the 3rd edition it was always our intention that the Dictionary should be accepted as 
authoritative. We view authority as being achieved if a dictionary is accepted as a standard source 
of reference with defi nitions that are unanimously approved. The latter may be an unattainable 
ideal given the proximity of some aspects of economics to political dogma, but it is a commend-
able aspiration. Our intention for correctness had to be pursued within the constraints imposed by 
the needs of the target audience. 
As a discipline, economics admires technical sophistication so that there would, by necessity, 
be a divergence between a dictionary and the academic literature. It is most likely that many of 
the target audience will be looking to the Dictionary to provide an accessible explanation of a for-
mal term. We could not provide the formal defi nitions at the level of the reputable research jour-
nals because to do so would not serve the target audience. In fact, it would be next to impossible 
to serve our target audience of undergraduates while simultaneously reaching out to advanced 
graduate students.
Thus, a defi nition provided by an authoritative source must be credible and widely accepted. To 
a considerable extent, the authoritativeness is signalled by the stamp of a publisher, and the aca-
demic reputation of Oxford University Press is beyond any doubt one of the highest in the world. 
This, however, is not enough. Credibility and acceptance can be corroborated by the fact that the 
same defi nition is provided by many different sources, suggesting unanimity or, at least, a major-
ity being in agreement. However, many internet defi nitions appear to be copied from each other 
and often repeat the same mistake.
5.1. Example 5
An interesting defi nition to illustrate these observations is that of a corner solution. Searching on 
internet gives the typical defi nition:
 A corner solution is a special solution to an agent’s maximization problem in which the quantity of one 
of the arguments in the maximized function is zero. The more usual solution will lie in the non-zero 
interior at the point of tangency between the objective function and the constraint. ... (www.wordvia.
com/dictionary/corner solution)
The internet defi nition of a corner solution is similar to the defi nition that is found in the 2nd edi-
tion:
 corner solution A solution to a system of equations where some variables are zero. …
As a general defi nition of a corner solution both of these are incorrect. They can be correct if pro-
vided with an appropriate context but, in the absence of such context, the defi nitions are incorrect 
and misleading. 
To see why the defi nitions are incorrect consider the problem of maximising the value of the 
function – x2 on the interval [–1,1]. A graph of the function is shown in Figure 1, and it is clear 
that the value that gives the maximum is x = 0. This is an interior point of the interval on which 
the function is defi ned. A corner solution in this case would be either at –1 or at 1. This shows how 
the defi nition can be incorrect in the absence of further elaboration of the situation it is describing 
even though it does give the impression of authority.
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Figure 1. The graph of – x2
It might be argued that the additional context is not necessary because that is provided by the 
fact that the defi nition is located within a dictionary of economics. A further economic example 
can show why this argument does not apply, and that there are very standard examples of econo-
mic analysis for which the defi nitions are incorrect.
Most undergraduate students of economics will be taken through an analysis of the saving deci-
sion of a consumer. The usual setting for this problem is to assume there are two time periods, say, 
young age and old age. The consumer has an income in both periods, and in the fi rst period must 
choose how much to save. The underlying issue is the allocation of consumption across the two 
periods and, given the incomes, it is the level of saving that determines this. The choice variable 
of the consumer is the level of saving, s. Three categories of outcome are then possible:
 s < 0, which represents borrowing against future income to consume now,
s = 0, which is choosing to neither borrow nor save,
s > 0, which represents saving some current income to consume later.
The choice of s is limited by the constraints that saving cannot exceed current income and that the 
consumer must be able to repay any borrowing. Provided the consumer has the ability to under-
take some borrowing and some saving, then s = 0 is an interior solution, and not a corner solution.
The defi nition of corner solution in the 3rd edition is intended to capture the basic properties 
that matter without the need to provide extensive details of context. The defi nition is:
 corner solution In the context of a constrained optimization problem this is a solution that does not 
change in at least one direction in response to any arbitrarily small perturbation to the gradient of the 
objective function at the optimum.
This defi nition can be criticised for not being all that insightful or detailed, but it does have the 
advantages of being brief and perfectly general. Any improved alternative would need to provide 
either further mathematical detail (which we wished to avoid) or a convoluted verbal explanation.
The observations made about defi ning a corner solution take us into a discussion of the appro-
priate level of mathematics and abstraction in the defi nitions. This was a central concern in revis-
ing the Dictionary. It would have been very easy to produce a formally correct and highly techni-
cal dictionary that was of no value to the target audience. In making the revisions it was always 
in our minds that the typical user was likely to be turning to a dictionary to discover an explana-
tion of an unfamiliar technical concept. It would defeat the purpose of the dictionary if such a user 
had found a defi nition written in an equally technical and formal way. This was the dimension in 
which we needed to explain concepts. Equally, we had to balance this with the need to be correct, 
and to avoid issues such as those discussed above with corner solution.
21
We now return to our Example 3, the defi nition of concept of equilibrium, to illustrate the dif-
ferent levels of formality that could be used within a defi nition. The concept of equilibrium is fun-
damental to economics. Economists conduct their analysis by constructing models and exploring 
what the models predict. A fi rst step of such an exploration is often to describe what constitutes 
equilibrium. The philosophy behind this step is that equilibrium is the state of the modelled eco-
nomic environment that is most likely to emerge from economic activity. 
The fi rst step is to interpret equilibrium in the sense of a market equilibrium, and so to focus on 
supply and demand. Following this approach it is possible to state the conditions for equilibrium 
with increasing generality and rigor. First, we can have the basic statement that equilibrium oc-
curs when the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied:
(i)   	

 
Using functional notation for the demand curve and supply curve allows this statement to be re-
cast as
(ii)    
where now the quantities demanded and supplied are determined by price. These two statements 
do not allow the possibility that demand for the good may exceed supply even when the price is 
zero. We can extend the defi nition to defi ne equilibrium as a position where
(iii)   
 	 
  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The fi rst line states that price cannot be negative, and the second line states that if a good is in ex-
cess supply, that is, more is supplied than is demanded, the price of this good should be zero in 
equilibrium. Finally, the concept can be extended to equilibrium holding simultaneously for many 
markets and a recognition of the need for price normalisation by using the excess demand func-
tion, to write
(iv)     	 

The second approach to defi ning equilibrium is to consider the existence of equilibrium for a 
game of strategy. The defi nition of equilibrium then focuses on the choice of strategy by econo-
mic agents. An equilibrium set of strategies can be defi ned in different ways. The simplest is just 
to state:
(i) An equilibrium is a situation in which no economic agent has an incentive to change 
strategy.
A more formal defi nition would bring into account that the strategies are chosen to maximize an 
objective function.
(ii) An equilibrium is a situation in which the strategies of the n players, s =  
     ,are such that 




(iii) An equilibrium is a situation in which the strategies of the n players, s =




The latter statement would require further defi nition of the best-response mapping ρ(s) and a dis-
cussion of the fi xed point argument that is invoked.
Arrow and Debreu used the second approach to demonstrate existence of equilibrium in the 
fi rst approach. They exploited the fact that there is equivalence between the existence of an equi-
librium for a market and the existence of an equilibrium of an appropriately specifi ed game of 




strategy. The different ways in which these ideas are expressed in the 2nd and the 3rd editions can 
be seen from the alternative defi nitions.
There are, of course, terms in the 3rd edition for which formal statements with technical details 
have been given. However, in all such cases a simple descriptive statement is always given fi rst, 
and some attempt is made to mention the practical use of the concept. This is illustrated in the 
next example.
5.2. Example 6
The fi nal example is illustrative of how it is possible to combine a brief verbal explanation along-
side a more formal, and detailed, further description. The defi nition is made more useful through 
the inclusion of numerous links to further defi nitions.
 expenditure function The minimum cost for a consumer of achieving a given utility level. Consider a 




, of two goods to minimize expenditure subject to a utility 
constraint. The cost minimization problem is
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 The solution is described by the two *compensated demand functions 

















 Substituting the optimal choices back into the objective gives the minimized level of expenditure as


































a result that is useful for calculating the welfare consequences of a price change. See also indirect util-
ity function.
6. Moving online
There is an ever increasing quantity of information readily available on the internet and the access 
to the internet is becoming universal. It is perhaps the case already that 100 percent of university 
students have almost unlimited internet access even in less developed countries. This means that 
many potential purchasers of the Dictionary fi nd it convenient to look up the meaning of an unfa-
miliar term online. Academic publishers have recognized this, and have started providing online 
versions of printed reference sources, just as this was done with academic journals for decades. 
The Oxford University Press is one of the leaders in this area and even has a separate website for 
its online reference literature (www.oxfordreference.com). Despite this expertise, the current on-
line version of the Dictionary is no more that the paper version on a different platform.
An online platform offers new opportunities for the Dictionary, which can help address some 
of the issues that have had to be confronted in producing a paper version. Revision of an online 
version does not involve the production costs of a paper dictionary, so frequent updates could be 
made to help eliminate outdated information. Layered information with all cross-references con-
nected by hyperlinks could allow simpler reference to related concepts. In addition to making the 
use of a dictionary more convenient, layered information would facilitate additional formality 
and details that could be pursued by the interested user. Links could also be provided to (reputa-
ble) external online sources, such as the offi cial websites of international organizations (say, the 
World Trade Organization in the entry on barriers to trade) or government departments (say, Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in the entry on tax evasion).
However, as with any resource, exploitation of the technology requires the commitment of the 
publisher. There may be no funds available for investing in design and support of online sources. 
The production of a successful online dictionary would require an informed design effort to cre-
ate a website with enough visual information to make its use easy and transparent, without mak-
ing visual content so large that time it takes for a web page to download makes it unhelpful and 
23
frustrates the users. In a traditional publishing house used to dealing with printed material, no ex-
pertise may be available to support this effort. The benefi ts of frequent updating are only gained if 
the compilers have direct access to the website to make their own revisions. This permission may 
not be forthcoming if the dictionary is hosted on the publisher’s server.
The need to structure linked and layered data will also make the construction of the dictionary 
more time consuming, but updating can allow this to be distributed over time. Moreover, it could 
become a continuous process with frequent updating and development provided the compilers 
could directly post revisions to the hosting web server. The benefi ts for the users and the popu-
larity of well-designed, user-friendly and timely updated online edition of a dictionary will more 
than justify the cost invested in its creation.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we described our approach to preparing a new edition of the Oxford University Press 
Dictionary of Economics. The main factor that we had to take into account was that economics 
has evolved as an academic discipline where research is based on the application of mathemat-
ics and statistics. The balance between the level of formality and rigor and the level of accessibil-
ity to the intended audience of undergraduate students provides a challenge for the compiler of a 
dictionary.
To meet this challenge a compiler must be an expert or at least have a good working knowledge 
of the technical advances in the discipline, and must understand the formalities but also be able 
to convey highly technical concepts in an accessible language without much loss for the content. 
Furthermore, in a good dictionary an entry should not be just the statement but also should play 
an explanatory role. To achieve all of these requires a combination of skills. We hope that the ex-
amples in the paper show convincingly that in this regard the revised edition is a step forward. A 
major limitation of a static printed edition is the time and resources it takes to update and correct 
the existing entries and to add new entries brought about by the evolution of economics as a dis-
cipline and by the new developments in economic and political environment.
An online edition can relax many of the constraints but only if the technology is exploited ef-
fectively and effi ciently. This seems to be now the direction where the major publishing houses, 
including Oxford University Press, are moving, to the great benefi t of authors and users alike. An 
online edition represents a signifi cant challenge for the compilers but the benefi ts would be sig-
nifi cant. Possibly the greatest benefi t would be the possibility of developing a reference tool that 
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